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Article

Making Defendants Speak
Ted Sampsell-Jones†
INTRODUCTION
Criminal defendants have a right to testify in their own defense.1 They also have a right to remain silent at trial.2 Under
the Constitution, the choice is theirs.3
But while the abstract constitutional ideal of free choice is
appealing, the complicated and messy reality of modern criminal trials makes it impossible to grant a defendant a truly free
choice. A defendant’s decision is not made in a legal vacuum.
Myriad legal rules—rules of evidence, rules of procedure, and
rules of substantive criminal law—affect his choice. Some legal
rules burden testimony and encourage silence. Other legal
rules burden silence and encourage testimony.
State neutrality between testimony and silence is neither
possible nor desirable.4 Any legal rule that affects testifying
and non-testifying defendants differently will burden one right

† Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Thanks
to George Fisher, John Langbein, and Brad Colbert for their helpful comments. Copyright © 2009 by Ted Sampsell-Jones.
1. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49–53 (1987). The right to testify
has no explicit textual source but rather “has sources in several provisions of
the Constitution,” including the Due Process Clause and the Compulsory
Process Clause. Id. at 51.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
3. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (“Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so.”); see
also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 (stating that the Constitution ensures the “right of a
criminal defendant to choose between silence and testifying in his own behalf ”
(quoting Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Clark, J., concurring))).
4. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973) (stating that the
Constitution does not forbid “every government-imposed choice in the criminal
process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional
rights”).
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or the other. Such rules pervade the criminal process, and removing them all would be impossible, or at least unwise.
When a defendant takes the stand, for example, the prosecutor may cross-examine him. The prosecutor’s ability to crossexamine a defendant chills the latter’s right to testify—it
makes the exercise of that right costly. In the interest of eliminating the cost, we could reform evidence law to prohibit prosecutorial cross-examination of criminal defendants. But such a
reform would be senseless. Even if it would promote “neutrality” by unburdening the right to testify, it would be anomalous
in evidence law, and it would impede the truth-seeking function
of trial.5
In any event, a debit on one side of the ledger is a credit on
the other. Under the current regime, one benefit of remaining
silent is the ability to avoid cross-examination. Removing the
cost imposed on testimony would also remove the benefit associated with silence. That dynamic applies generally for a simple
reason: exercising the constitutional right to testify necessarily
involves waiving the constitutional right to remain silent, and
vice versa. To the extent that a legal rule creates incentives to
exercise one right, it inevitably creates disincentives to exercise
the other. It is a zero-sum game.
Thus, the question is not whether the current set of rules
burdens the exercise of either right—of course it does, as would
any reasonable set of rules. The question is not whether the
current set of rules is neutral between the two options—it is
not neutral, and no reasonable set of rules could be neutral. Instead, the question is simply whether the current set of rules
creates the proper mix of incentives and disincentives. In my
view, it does not. The legal system punishes defendants too
much for taking the stand, and rewards defendants too much
for remaining silent. Courts should adjust the mix by rewarding defendants more for testifying and punishing them more for
declining to testify.
There are two main reasons why we should encourage
more defendants to testify. First and foremost, it would give the
jury access to important additional information, and thereby
5. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 57 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“A defendant’s decision to testify may be inhibited by . . . the possibility that damaging evidence not otherwise admissible will be admitted to impeach his credibility. These constraints arise solely from the fact that the
defendant is quite properly treated like any other witness who testifies at trial.”).
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help the jury reach accurate results. Second, it would increase
defendants’ own participation in the criminal process, which
would improve perceptions of legitimacy, thereby aiding rehabilitation and reintegration. Increasing lay participation would
also reduce dependence on lawyers, which could reduce systematic disparities between rich and poor defendants.
Toward those ends, I propose three reforms. First, as a
matter of constitutional criminal procedure, the Supreme Court
should overrule Griffin v. California,6 and should thus allow
prosecutors to argue adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence. Second, as a matter of evidence law, courts should alter
or abandon the Gordon v. United States7 test for Rule 609,8 and
admit fewer prior convictions for impeachment. Third, as a
matter of sentencing law, courts should not impose perjury enhancements based on a defendant’s trial testimony.9
Of the countless possible reforms that could make more defendants speak, these three are proposed in large part because
each has independent legal merit. Each is justifiable at the doctrinal level—as a matter of evidence law, as a matter of criminal procedure, and as a matter of substantive criminal law. In
addition to furthering the goals sketched above, each stands
independently on a solid doctrinal footing.
Taken individually, the first proposal would benefit the
prosecution, while the second and third proposals would benefit
defendants. Taken together, however, the goal of the proposed
reforms is not to tip the scales in either direction. The goal, rather, is to encourage more defendants to speak at trial, and
thus to increase the accuracy, legitimacy, and fairness of criminal adjudication.
I. RATIONALE
Our current legal system encourages criminal defendants
to remain silent. We should change the system in a way that
6. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the SelfIncrimination Clause prevents instructions and arguments suggesting an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence).
7. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939–41 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (setting forth factors that courts should consider when weighing the admission of
prior felonies).
8. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (allowing the admission of prior felonies for
impeachment subject to a probative-prejudice balancing test).
9. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(b) (2008)
(allowing for a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice,
including trial perjury).
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encourages more defendants to testify. Doing so would have
several benefits. It would improve accuracy, participation, legitimacy, and equity.
A. ACCURACY
Criminal proceedings have some intrinsic value, but for the
most part, their value is instrumental.10 The primary goal of a
criminal proceeding is to determine whether a defendant committed a crime and, if so, what crime.11 Criminal proceedings
have instrumental value insofar as they lead to accurate determinations of those issues.12
Criminal adjudication is a sorting process—the judicial
system attempts to determine which defendants are guilty and
which are not.13 It is a human system, and errors are inevitable.14 There are two types of errors: false positives, where an
innocent person is found guilty; and false negatives, where a
guilty person is set free.15 Criminal law reform proposals often
falter because they decrease one type of error only at the cost of
increasing the other. Proposals aimed at providing greater protections to defendants may reduce false positives, but they almost invariably increase false negatives.
10. Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE L.J. 657,
674 –75 (describing the theory that constitutional “liberty” demands fair judicial proceedings); Frank Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP.
CT. REV. 85, 109–15 (discussing the Court’s instrumental justification for specifying process once a statute has specified substance).
11. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“[T]he central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt
or innocence . . . .”).
12. See Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 1030 (2006)
(“[T]he main, though certainly not the only, goal for evidence law is to promote
accuracy in fact finding.”).
13. See generally DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE
ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2003) (tracing the history of criminal procedure and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s role in the criminal procedure doctrine); see also Darryl K.
Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 817 (2004) (stating that the adversary
criminal process has “a primary goal of truth-finding”).
14. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 155–57
(Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2d ed. 2005) (1947) (discussing how medieval inquisitors
insisted on confessions because of the possibility of error); LARRY LAUDAN,
TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW 1–3 (2006) (describing the role errors play
in criminal trials).
15. Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 994 –95 (2005).
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Historically, Anglo-American jurisprudence took the normative position that false positives are worse than false negatives.16 As Blackstone famously said, “it is better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”17 Courts18 and
academics19 tirelessly repeat the maxim. But Blackstone’s tento-one ratio is not self-evidently true.20 Perhaps two-to-one is
the correct ratio, or perhaps one hundred-to-one is best.21 Underlying normative disagreement about the proper ratio,
though it rarely rises to the surface of explicit argument, may
well drive debates about specific reform proposals.22
Regardless of the proper ratio, both errors are costly.23 To
the extent that the judicial system can reduce both types of error, it should do so. If there are legal reforms that will increase
the accuracy of the sorting mechanism—helping to convict
more of the guilty and free more of the innocent—courts and
legislatures should embrace them. Encouraging more defendants to speak would increase the accuracy of the fact-finding
16. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Clotida, 892 F.2d 1098, 1105 (1st Cir. 1989);
United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 27–28 (2d Cir. 1989); People v.
Scott, 151 P.2d 517, 527 (Cal. 1944); State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 790 (Conn.
1997) (Berdon, J., concurring and dissenting); McGinnis v. State, 31 Ga. 236,
252 (1860); State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305, 309 (Utah 2005).
19. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1523 (1996); Joshua
Dressler, Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Responsibility, and the Supreme Court:
How A Moderate Scholar Can Appear Immoderate Thirty Years Later, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1507, 1524 n.74 (1999); Erin Murphy, The New Forensics:
Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific
Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 775 (2007); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1168 (2003); Dan Simon, A Third View
of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 511, 572 (2004).
20. See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 –77
(1997) (asking why ten is the number indoctrinated in legal scholarship).
21. See Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even
Odds, 52 STAN. L. REV. 873, 879 n.19 (2000).
22. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 413, 416–17 (1999) (arguing that empirical debates about deterrence
mask cultural and moral conflict).
23. See Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42
DUQ. L. REV. 663, 680 (2004) (noting that “we see a great cost in any Type I
error” [false positive] and that Type II errors [false negatives] impose “additional costs on society”); cf. Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending
the Indefensible, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 156–57 (2004) (discussing the
tradeoff between false positives and false negatives in the war on terrorism).
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process. It would help to reduce both false negatives and false
positives.
Criminal defendants themselves are often a critical source
of information about what happened.24 In some cases, such as
homicide cases with no witnesses other than the defendant and
the victim, the defendant is often one of the only good sources
of information.25 Depriving the jury of defendant testimony deprives the jury of key information.26
Paradoxically, the value of defendants as an informational
resource was recognized at common law more than it is today.
Defendants were not allowed to take an oath or formally testify, but they were expected to present their own defense, answering and explaining away the prosecution’s evidence.27 In
fact, as Hawkins explained in the early eighteenth century, the
common law denied the assistance of counsel in order to make
defendants speak.
[E]very one of Common Understanding may as properly speak to a
Matter of Fact, as if he were the best Lawyer; and that it requires no
manner of Skill to make a plain and honest Defence, which in Cases
of this Kind is always the best, the Simplicity and Innocence, artless
and ingenuous Behaviour of one whose Conscience acquits him, having something in it more moving and convincing than the highest
Eloquence of Persons speaking in a Cause not their own. . . . [T]he
Innocent, for whose Safety alone the Law is concerned, have rather
an Advantage than Prejudice in having the Court their only Counsel.
Whereas on the other Side, the very Speech, Gesture and Countenance, and Manner of Defence of those who are guilty, when they
speak for themselves, may often help to disclose the Truth, which

24. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 1–9
(2003) (discussing the importance of the accused as an informational resource).
25. See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 229–41
(1827) (describing the reasons behind the rule against self-incrimination and
the value of self-provided testimony); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1376–77 (1991)
(describing the privilege against self-incrimination as a truth-impairing right);
John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 86
(1891) (“[I]f an accused person is innocent, he should be [able] to explain the
facts of his conduct and vindicate himself . . . .”).
26. See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1076–77 (1986) (describing the effect
on a jury of a defendant not testifying); Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to Be Let
Alone, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 223 (1960).
27. See LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 14, 35–36 (describing the lawyer-free
“accused speaks” criminal trial that prevailed in England from the sixteenth
century into the eighteenth century).
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probably would not so well be discovered from the artificial Defence of
others speaking for them.28

Hawkins was overly sanguine about the value of defendants’ testimony. Some guilty defendants are slick liars, and
their testimony may produce false negatives. Some innocent defendants are bad witnesses, ineloquent, contradictory or nervous, and their testimony may produce false positives.29 On the
whole, however, encouraging more defendants to testify would
enhance the accuracy of the sorting process.
Admittedly, there is no way to prove empirically that more
defendant testimony would lead to more accurate results.
There is no good way to study the effect of a defendant’s testimony in a real trial without conducting the trial twice, once
with the defendant’s testimony and once without.30 Mock trial
studies, though they allow for a control group, have inherent
limitations due in part to their inability to replicate real trials.31
Nonetheless, the common sense argument that more defendant testimony would increase trial accuracy has some empirical support. There is a body of research suggesting that
while jurors do not have much ability to assess truthfulness
based on a witness’s demeanor, they do have some ability to assess truthfulness based on the content of a witness’s statement.32 Moreover, the most recent empirical research provides
more reason for optimism about jurors’ ability to detect lies, especially when jurors are provided with sufficient information to
28. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 400,
reprinted in AMERICAN LAW: THE FORMATIVE YEARS (photo. reprint 1972) (2d
ed. corrected 1724).
29. See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893) (explaining that
innocent defendants may fear testifying because nervousness may increase
rather than remove prejudice against them).
30. Even if such an experiment were possible, it would be worthless without knowing in advance the truth of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Conducting a trial twice could demonstrate whether the presence of a defendant’s
testimony affects the outcome. Without knowing actual guilt or innocence,
however, there would be no way to know whether the presence of a defendant’s
testimony led to the right outcome.
31. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury
Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997); see also Brian H. Bornstein,
The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 75, 88 (1999).
32. See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075,
1100–01 (1991) (reviewing the empirical research and concluding that while
jurors are not effective at detecting lies by viewing witness demeanor, they are
at least somewhat effective at detecting lies by assessing the content of witness testimony).
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provide context to any witness’s testimony.33 The research suggests, in other words, that jurors with more information are
more likely to reach correct results.34 Juries are not perfect lie
detectors,35 to be sure, but they are decent.
A defendant’s value as a resource of information does not
mean, as Hawkins argued, that she should be denied counsel.
Nor does it necessarily mean, as modern commentators since
Bentham have argued, that the right against self-incrimination
should be scrapped altogether.36 The more moderate point is
simply that a defendant’s silence is truth-impairing, and that
we should not enact or maintain legal rules that create a preference for silence over testimony without a very good reason to
do so.
B. PARTICIPATION, LEGITIMACY, AND EQUITY
Aside from the instrumental values of accuracy in sorting,
criminal proceedings have intrinsic value as well37 because
33. See Bella DePaulo et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the
Detection of Deception, 1 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346, 347 (1997); Maria
Hartwig et al., Strategic Use of Evidence During Police Interviews: When
Training to Detect Deception Works, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 604 (2006);
Hee Sun Park et al., How People Really Detect Lies, 69 COMM. MONOGRAPHS
144, 145 (2002).
34. Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2568 (2008) (reviewing recent research and concluding
that “[o]bservers not only use context, they also use it effectively”).
35. See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575,
578 (1997).
36. 5 BENTHAM, supra note 25, at 226–27. For examples of modern scholars criticizing the self-incrimination right, see Dolinko, supra note 26, at
1064; Donald A. Dripps, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 699, 701 (1988); and Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 672
(1968). See also Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8–11
(1986) (discussing various critiques of the privilege).
37. For general discussions of the intrinsic value of legal procedures, see
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 893–94 (1999); Lani
Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413, 1489 (1991); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare,
114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1212–13 (2001); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C.
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 482–91 (1986); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 296, 357–59 (1996); and Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 181, 226–32 (2004).
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they create an opportunity for participation—a day in court.38
For a criminal defendant, “a participatory opportunity may also
be psychologically important” simply “to have played a part in”
the process that decides his fate.39 Regardless of the result,
criminal defendants view the process as more legitimate if they
have the opportunity to tell their side of the story.40
For defendants, the lack of any opportunity to participate
in the process can be frustrating and alienating.41 The inability
to participate causes negative perceptions of legitimacy and
fairness.42 Those perceptions, in turn, can inhibit reintegration
and foster recidivism.43 In short, “procedural justice shapes legitimacy,” and “legitimacy shapes recidivism.”44
38. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (stating that the
“[T]wo central concerns of procedural due process [are] the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.”); Henry J.
Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1275–77 (1975);
William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 661, 662
(1985); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 160–63
(1978).
39. Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural
Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 126, 127 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
40. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483 (1988) (demonstrating the importance of procedural
justice to convicted criminals’ perceptions of fairness and legitimacy); see also
Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical
Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 463–67 (2007) (examining the reasons given by criminal defendants who decline appointed
counsel).
41. See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1494 –96 (2005) (discussing how defendants’
silence decreases their understanding of and engagement with the criminal
process, thus inhibiting remorse and rehabilitation); Michael M. O’Hear,
Faith, Justice, and the Teaching of Criminal Procedure, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 87,
90–91 (discussing a noninstrumental approach to criminal procedure).
42. Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the
Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 167–68;
see also United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (arguing
that allocution “helps assure the fairness, and hence legitimacy, of the sentencing process”); United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir.
1994) (“[A]llocution ‘has value in terms of maximizing the perceived equity of
the process.’” (quoting United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir.
1991))); Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2672–74 (2007) (discussing the benefits to defendants of allocution rights).
43. See Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Balanced and Restorative
Justice: Prospects for Juvenile Justice in the 21st Century, in JUVENILE JUS-
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Many criminal defendants who would prefer to testify are
dissuaded from doing so.45 Their attorneys advise them—quite
correctly—that given the current set of legal rules, the relative
costs of taking the stand are high, and that remaining silent is
a far safer option.46 That dynamic has systematic costs, not just
in the deprivation of information to the jury, but also in the deprivation of the defendant’s opportunity to participate in a profoundly important event in his life.47
A beneficial side effect of increasing lay participation in the
criminal process would be reducing dependence on lawyers.48
When a criminal defendant does not testify, he must defend
himself by proxy. He must rely on other defense witnesses, and,
most importantly, on his attorney.49 Thus, when fewer defendants testify, attorneys necessarily take a more important role
in the criminal process.50

SOURCEBOOK 467, 468 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2004); Robin Bradley Kar,
Hart’s Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEO. L.J. 393, 459–60
(2007); Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1342–43 (2006); Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and
Contempt: The Limitations of Expressive Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
133, 178–81 (2003).
44. Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and
Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the
Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 553,
575–76 (2007).
45. See Natapoff, supra note 41, at 1471.
46. See id. at 1470.
47. See Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon’s Shadow: The Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 363, 393 (2003).
48. For general discussions of the economic and efficiency drawbacks of
lawyer-dominated legal process, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531,
533–36 (1994); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 19–20 (1988); Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence,
69 IND. L.J. 1, 1–3 (1993); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 814 –17 (1994); Michelle J.
White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers’ Benefit from Litigation, 12 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 381, 393–95 (1992); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and
the Development of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1119, 1123–24
(1997).
49. See LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 310 (“Adversary trial put in place a
new conception of the trial, oriented on the lawyers. Criminal trial became an
opportunity for defense counsel to test the prosecution case.”).
50. See Natapoff, supra note 41, at 1469 (“The most immediate engine of a
defendant’s silence is his lawyer.”).
TICE
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In a lawyer-dominated criminal process, the results can be
skewed by the quality of legal representation. Defendants with
lower quality representation are more likely to receive adverse
results.51 On the whole, poor defendants are more likely to receive lower quality representation.52 A very wealthy criminal
defendant can afford to hire a private attorney who, if paid
hourly, has a substantial incentive to spend the time necessary
to mount a vigorous defense.53 Wealthy defendants can also afford to hire investigators, experts, and other witnesses.54 In
short, for a wealthy defendant, defending herself by proxy is
relatively easy and often beneficial.
A poor defendant, by contrast, must rely on whatever system of indigent defense the state provides—typically a public
defender. While many public defenders are excellent attorneys,
financial constraints on the system of public defense—
especially at the state level—often preclude the sort of aggressive, thorough defense that defendants desire.55 Public defenders often have large caseloads that make it impossible to devote
significant time to any individual case.56 Because they are
mostly salaried, they lack financial incentives to spend extra
51. See LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 318.
52. See id. at 315 (discussing the “wealth effect” of the lawyer-dominated
adversary criminal trial).
53. See Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 251, 252–53 (1985) (discussing the incentives
created by hourly pay); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1991)
(“The standard hourly fee eliminates an incentive the lawyer might have under other fee arrangements to work insufficient hours on the case.”).
54. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF
ATTORNEYS AT WORK 5 (1985); Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 409–11 (1991); William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 787 (1988); Rodney Uphoff,
Convicting the Innocent: Abberation or Systematic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
739, 747.
55. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 48–49 (1995); Carol
J. DeFrances, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, State-Funded Indigent Defense
Services, 1999 (2001 N.C.J. 188464), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/sfids99.pdf.
56. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1729, 1765 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1240–41 (1993);
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 10–11 (1997); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Taking It to the Streets, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 153, 165 (2004).

1338

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1327

time on any given case.57 They also lack resources needed to
conduct full investigations, to hire experts, and to locate and
prepare other witnesses.58 In short, poor defendants frequently
receive less assistance from their attorneys than wealthy defendants do. To the extent that legal rules increase the importance of attorneys in the criminal process, they increase disparities between rich and poor defendants.
The current legal system encourages defendants to remain
silent and thus encourages defense by proxy. The defense-byproxy system hurts poor defendants more than wealthy defendants. Adjusting the incentives that shape the decision to testify would increase lay participation in the criminal process and
reduce dependence on lawyers.
II. PROPOSALS
For reasons of accuracy, legitimacy, and equity, it is worth
considering measures that would encourage more criminal defendants to testify. Of course, the value of testimony is not infinite, and there are important countervailing considerations.
Thus, it would not make sense to torture non-testifying defendants, nor would it make sense to free testifying defendants
from all manner of impeachment and cross-examination. But
courts should pursue reasonable reforms to encourage more
testimony. To the extent that courts depart from generally applicable rules of evidence and procedure, they should depart in
a way that will result in more testimony, not less.
Unfortunately, the criminal justice system currently departs from generally applicable rules of law in ways that encourage silence. In several areas of law, courts have created
doctrines that are internally unsound and create perverse incentives that dissuade defendants from testifying. These doctrines, in other words, are both dubious in their own rights and
unwise as policy matters because they punish defendants too
much for testifying and reward them too much for remaining
57. See Albert W. Alschuler, Guilty Plea: Plea Bargaining, in 2 ENCYCLOCRIME AND JUSTICE 832–33 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (discussing the perverse incentives of salaried public defenders); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1989–90 (1992).
58. Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003); see also Mary Sue Backus & Paul
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1098 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense
Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 235
(2004).
PEDIA OF
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silent. Courts should reconsider these unsound and unwise
judicial practices.
Three such doctrines are targeted here.59 The first is the
“no adverse inference” rule of Griffin v. California, which forbids prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s silence.60 The
Griffin rule makes little sense as a matter of constitutional law,
forbids a reasonable evidentiary inference, and is unduly solicitous of silence. The second is the Gordon v. United States test
for Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which governs the admission
of prior convictions for the purpose of impeachment.61 The Gordon test fails to respect the text of Rule 609 or normal principles of evidence law, and by admitting too many convictions,
it severely punishes defendants who testify. The third is the
judicial practice of enhancing sentences based on a defendant’s
perjured trial testimony.62 Such sentence enhancements do little to deter perjury, and they add another unnecessary disincentive to testifying.
These three doctrines should be reformed. Legislatures
could, of course, add additional and even stronger protestimony reforms, but no such legislative reforms are considered here. The best first move is one that should be made by
courts: they should clear their case law of the ill-advised, judgemade doctrines that promote silence.
A. PROPOSAL ONE: MOVING BEYOND GRIFFIN
Griffin v. California is part of the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure canon. In Griffin, the Court held that prosecutors
and trial judges may not suggest that any adverse inference be
drawn from a defendant’s decision to remain silent at trial. The
Court later extended Griffin to cover even indirect comments
on silence,63 and to require a jury instruction prohibiting adverse inferences.64
59. For a recent article arguing for a similar set of proposed reforms, see
Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal
Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851 (2008).
60. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
61. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936,
939–40 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
62. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2008). For a discussion of state analogues, see infra note 210.
63. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (prohibiting the use of
silence as “substantive evidence of guilt” in criminal cases). But see United
States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 25 (1988) (holding that when defense counsel
suggests that the prosecution prevented the defendant from telling his side of
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The Court has since lauded the Griffin rule as “an essential feature of our legal tradition.”65 But such breathless praise
does little to hide the fact that the Griffin rule is dubious both
as a matter of evidence law and as a matter of constitutional
law.
1. Evidence and Inference in Griffin
The facts of Griffin are worth recounting briefly, in part
because they appear nowhere in the Supreme Court’s opinion.
Early on the morning of December 3, 1961, a man named Alfredo Villasenor was walking down an alley when he saw Eddie
Griffin emerge from a large trash box.66 Griffin zipped up his
pants.67 Villasenor asked Griffin what he was doing and Griffin
responded “Nothing” and walked away.68 Villasenor then discovered Essie Mae Hodson in the trash box, badly beaten,
bleeding and barely conscious.69 She died the next afternoon
from head injuries.70
Griffin stayed overnight with Essie Mae and her partner
after drinking with them at a local bar.71 According to the prosecution, Griffin fought Essie Mae’s partner in their apartment,
then dragged her to the alley and brutally raped her.72 When
he was arrested in Mexico, Griffin told police that Essie Mae’s
injuries were sustained during the earlier fight in the apartment, and that following that fight, Essie Mae had consented to
sex in the trash box.73
Griffin did not testify at trial74 (no doubt in part because
the story he had told police was so wholly implausible). The trial judge instructed the jury that “among the inferences that
may be reasonably drawn” from the defendant’s silence, “those
the story, the prosecution may point out the defendant’s failure to testify).
64. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 288 (1981) (holding that jury
instructions are constitutionally required when properly requested by the defendant).
65. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999).
66. People v. Griffin, 383 P.2d 432, 434 (Cal. 1963), rev’d, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 434 –35.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 434.
72. Id. at 434 –35.
73. Id. at 435.
74. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 609 (1965).
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unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.”75 The
prosecutor made the following argument to the jury:
What kind of a man is it that would want to have sex with a woman
that beat up if she was beat up at the time he left? He would know
that. He would know how she got down the alley. He would know how
the blood got on the bottom of the concrete steps. He would know how
long he was with her in that box. He would know how her wig got off.
He would know whether he beat her or mistreated her. He would
know whether he walked away from that place cool as a cucumber
when he saw Mr. Villasenor because he was conscious of his own guilt
and wanted to get away from that damaged or injured woman. These
things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain. And
in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant would
know. Essie Mae is dead, she can’t tell you her side of the story. The
defendant won’t.76

2. Griffin’s Shaky Underpinnings
The Supreme Court ruled that the adverse inference instruction and the prosecutor’s argument violated the SelfIncrimination Clause.77 The Court’s opinion was, to put it gently, sparse. Its legal analysis essentially consisted of two sentences: “It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its
assertion costly.”78
The problem with the adverse inference, in the Court’s
view, was that it imposed a condition on the exercise of the
right.79 Griffin was, in other words, an application of the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.80 The Court’s reasoning,

75. Id. at 610.
76. Id. at 610–11.
77. Id. at 612–15.
78. Id. The Court also noted that many state statutes prohibited adverse
inferences from silence. Id. at 611 n.3. And the Court noted that “comment on
the refusal to testify is a remnant of the ‘inquisitorial system of criminal justice.’” Id. at 614.
79. Id. at 614 (describing that if a defendant chooses to not testify, the
prosecution is not allowed to use his silence as evidence against him).
80. For discussions of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see, for
example, Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 6–11 (1988); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1935); Seth F. Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1298–301 (1984); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1143 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415–
29 (1989).
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however, like much of its unconstitutional conditions doctrine
in other areas, lacked cogency and analytical rigor.
At a minimum, the Griffin Court’s analysis moved much
too quickly. The Supreme Court has occasionally made statements to the effect that the state may not in any way punish
the exercise of constitutional rights.81 But as the Court has recognized elsewhere, state actors routinely impose costs on constitutional rights in various ways.82
In fact, in the very context of a defendant’s decision to testify, the Court has recognized that a defendant’s decision may
be limited and conditioned in various ways. Rule 60983 impeachment may penalize a defendant’s decision to testify—it
makes the assertion of the right to testify costly. The rule has
nonetheless been upheld against constitutional challenges.84
Sentencing enhancements for perjury also make the assertion
of a right costly, but they too have been upheld.85 Likewise,
rules of evidence and procedure will occasionally preclude a defendant from presenting a certain defense if he fails to testify.86
81. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1977) (“To punish
a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due
process violation of the most basic sort . . . .”).
82. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973) (stating that
the Constitution does not forbid “every government-imposed choice in the
criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights”).
83. FED. R. EVID. 609.
84. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 759–60 (2000); see also
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967) (“To say the United States Constitution is infringed simply because this type of evidence may be prejudicial and
limiting instructions inadequate to vitiate prejudicial effects, would make inroads into this entire complex code of state criminal evidentiary law, and
would threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence.”); United States v.
Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 846–48 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (rejecting constitutional challenge
to a statute that admitted prior convictions without regard to any balancing
test).
85. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96–98 (1993); United States
v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978).
86. Attorneys may only present arguments based on evidence in the
record. See United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 434 (6th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Earle, 375 F.3d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Trial courts may impose
limitations on defense attorney’s arguments when an argument strays beyond
evidence in the record. See United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 905 (2d Cir.
1988); United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1982). Thus, for
example, when a defendant fails to present any evidence supporting a theory
of self-defense, the trial court may refuse to present a self-defense instruction
and may forbid argument on the issue. See United States v. Perry, 223 F.3d
431, 433 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Scout, 112 F.3d 955, 960–62 (8th Cir.
1997).

2009]

MAKING DEFENDANTS SPEAK

1343

Such rules make the assertion of the right to remain silent
more costly, but they are nonetheless constitutional.
Griffin notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that such conditions are constitutional because “it is not
thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of
criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros
and cons in deciding whether to testify.”87 There is, in other
words, no “categorical ban on every governmental action affecting the strategic decisions of an accused, including decisions
whether or not to exercise constitutional rights.”88 To strike
down every law that imposes some cost on the right to testify or
the right to remain silent would “would make inroads into this
entire complex code of state criminal evidentiary law, and
would threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence.”89
Griffin’s stated rationale is grotesquely naïve. If there is a
constitutional basis for the Griffin no adverse inference rule, it
must be found elsewhere. What is needed is some theory to explain which conditions are constitutionally acceptable and
which are not.
a. Defining “Penalties”—The Baseline Problem
As an initial matter, a sensible evaluation of the Griffin
rule must incorporate the lessons learned from other applications of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. One of the
first critical lessons is that without defining some baseline,
there is no neutral, determinate way to classify what counts as
a “penalty.”90 As constitutional law scholars have recognized in
other contexts, what counts as a “penalty” or “benefit,” a “tax”
or “subsidy,” depends on positing some legal or moral baseline
from which departures can be measured.91
87. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971).
88. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96.
89. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 562.
90. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is
an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech and Abortion),
70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 602 (1990) (“[T]he distinction between ‘subsidy’ and ‘penalty’ . . . rel[ies] on a baseline defining the ordinary or desirable state of affairs. The courts must rely on some status quo to decide what people would
‘otherwise’ receive.”).
91. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 298–301 (1993);
Sullivan, supra note 80, at 1436; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987). For discussions of baseline problems in other
contexts, see, for example, Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L.
REV. 911, 956–72 (1989); Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional
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Imagine two sentencing regimes. The first punishes criminal convictions with a sentence of ten years, but gives a credit
of one year if the defendant testifies. The second punishes criminal convictions with a sentence of nine years, but adds an additional year if the defendant remains silent. The two regimes
are equivalent. To distinguish the two on the ground that the
first merely “rewards” testimony while the latter impermissibly
“punishes” silence is a meaningless semantic game.
The Supreme Court has at times played similar semantic
games. In the American system of plea bargaining, for example,
defendants receive lesser sentences if they accept a plea rather
than going to trial.92 Some have argued that plea discounts are
unconstitutional because they penalize a defendant for exercising his trial rights.93 The Supreme Court rejected that argument by recharacterizing the imposition of a penalty as an optional benefit: “we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for
the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State” by waiving his trial
rights.94 That characterization might make sense, but only if
there is some baseline from which to measure departures.
Recharacterization could have worked equally well in the
Griffin context. Rather than characterizing an adverse inference as a penalty on the right to remain silent, the Court could
have said that an adverse inference rule extends a benefit to
defendants in exchange for their waiver of the right to remain
Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593, 604 (1999); Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to
Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 408–09 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 645 (1996).
92. David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty?
Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 45, 45–47 (1982); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel
and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1611
(2005); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2561 (2004).
93. See, e.g., Albert A. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 63–65 (1975); Malvina Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principles in the Administration of Criminal Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea Bargaining
Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5–10 (1982); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1387–90 (1970); Tina
Wan, Note, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional
Conditions Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 33, 38 (2007); see also Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 802–03 (2003) (comparing the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine with doctrines of waiver in criminal procedure).
94. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).
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silent. Once again, the only way to settle which characterization is correct is by reference to some established baseline.
The Griffin Court only hinted about its baseline. It noted in
a footnote that forty-four states banned adverse inferences by
statute—that California’s rule stood in opposition to the “overwhelming consensus of the States.”95 Certainly, against the
backdrop of an overwhelming legislative consensus to bar adverse inferences, an outlier jurisdiction’s decision to depart
might look like a penalty. More bluntly, the legal status quo
frequently supplies a hidden but intuitive baseline condition.
But as a matter of constitutional law, there is no reason that
the legislative consensus in 1963 provides a permanent baseline, and that any departure from there is unconstitutional.
The Fifth Amendment does not mandate that all states must do
forever what most states did in 1963. Griffin’s apparent baseline, defined solely by the then-status quo, is untenable.
b. Neutrality
Griffin failed to define or justify any baseline to support its
result. It also failed to recognize an important related dynamic:
that in this context, there are not one but two rights necessarily implicated. A defendant must either testify or remain silent;
he cannot do both. A legal rule that raises the relative price of
one right necessarily lowers the relative price of the other. If it
is a zero-sum game, and there is no net loss, then the constitutional difficulty dissolves.
Recognizing that there are two rights at issue, however,
suggests a different approach to the Griffin problem: an approach based on state neutrality.96 Some language in other Supreme Court cases, including Miranda, supports such a view.97
An approach using neutrality as the touchstone might provide
a sturdier foundation for the Griffin rule than the oversimplified unconstitutional conditions rationale offered in the opinion
itself.

95. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 n.3 (1965).
96. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective:
The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2625 (1996) (“Although
officials need not encourage a suspect to remain silent, they must remain at
least neutral toward her decision not to speak.”).
97. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (requiring state governments to respect their citizens’ rights to remain silent until they choose to
speak); see also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976) (stating that
a defendant must have “free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer”).
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The difficulty with this approach lies in fashioning a workable definition of neutrality. It cannot be the case that any law
that affects testifying and non-testifying defendants differently
violates the principle of neutrality. It cannot be the case, in
other words, that any rule that has the incidental effect of raising the relative cost of one right or the other is void as nonneutral.
Neutrality is not a novel concept in constitutional law, and
a definition of neutrality for the Griffin context could be borrowed from elsewhere. In the First Amendment context, for example, the Supreme Court has held that where a “generally
applicable” law has the “incidental effect” of burdening the exercise of a constitutional right, the Constitution is not offended.98 Such laws are “valid and neutral” because their object
is not to burden the right; rather, they apply generally and only
burden the right incidentally.99
Such an approach could help to explain the Supreme
Court’s treatment of various laws affecting the decision to testify. Rules allowing impeachment of a defendant’s testimony, by
prior convictions or other means, are valid because they are
generally applicable rules that only incidentally burden the
right to testify. Sentencing enhancements for perjury are valid
because they punish lying on the stand, not the decision to testify itself. Because these rules (and myriad others) only incidentally burden constitutional rights, they are neutral, and
therefore valid.
It could be argued that an adverse inference from silence,
by contrast, violates the neutrality principle. It could be ar98. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990); see Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (“[T]he
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit governments
from burdening religious practices through generally applicable laws.”); Rice v.
Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[S]peech which, in its
effect, is tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct may
itself be legitimately proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to the
constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.”); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 768 (2001)
(“[A] person who breaks a law not directed at speech can claim no constitutional immunity just because he was acting for expressive reasons.”); Eugene
Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharged Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1294 –97 (2005).
99. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–80; see also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that a
“generally applicable” photo-identification law for voters was constitutional
even though it burdened the rights of certain voters).
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gued, in other words, that an adverse inference from silence is
invalid because it punishes the exercise of the right itself. This
argument—an argument from neutrality—is probably the best
possible justification for Griffin.
The difficulty with the argument from neutrality, however,
is that adverse inferences are themselves justified by generally
applicable rules of evidence. As I will explain more fully below,
generally applicable laws of evidence allow one party to argue
an adverse inference from her opponent’s failure to produce relevant evidence, and generally applicable laws of evidence allow consciousness of guilt to be inferred from silence.100 These
generally applicable rules, when applied to a non-testifying defendant, burden the right to remain silent, but they do so only
incidentally.
Thus, just as it can be said that a perjury enhancement
punishes a defendant’s decision to lie rather than his decision
to testify, it can be said that an adverse inference punishes a
defendant’s decision to withhold evidence rather than his decision to remain silent. Both laws are, in that sense, neutral.
Even if the Constitution mandates state neutrality between
testimony and silence, an adverse inference from silence is at
least arguably consistent with neutrality. Efforts to re-ground
the Griffin rule on a principle of neutrality might have no better prospects than the usual efforts to ground the rule in the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
c. Compulsion: Text, History, and Policy
In the end, however, there should be no need to engage in
difficult debates about the nature of neutrality, for the Constitution simply does not mandate neutrality. The Constitution
does not say “Congress shall make no law respecting a criminal
defendant’s decision to testify.” Rather, it simply says that no
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.”101 The relevant touchstone is compulsion. The
text leaves open the possibility of some state regulation of a defendant’s decision so long as the regulation does not rise to the
level of compulsion. The threat of an adverse inference, which
is after all a relatively trivial penalty compared to torture or
contempt, does not constitute compulsion.102
100. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
102. See Akhil Reed Amar, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
51–61 (1997) (comparing different definitions of compulsion from torture to the
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Of course, as in contract law, there is no easy way to draw
the line between valid consent and invalid coercion, between
permissible offers and impermissible threats.103 Threats involve departures from “the normal or natural or expected
course of events.”104 In other words, just as we can only differentiate between penalties and rewards by positing some baseline condition, we can only differentiate from offers and threats
by positing some baseline condition.105
If we appeal to history to supply the baseline, then Griffin
fails, for adverse inferences from silence were long approved at
common law, and “compulsion” was equated with sanctions
akin to torture and contempt.106 Similarly, if we appeal to genCourt’s “trivial” application of the “no worse off ” standard including no adverse inferences); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 439 (1987) (noting that Griffin endorses a view that even
“pressure that is wholly informal and psychological” can constitute “compulsion”).
103. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 615–26 (1943); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 478–83 (1980); Peter Westen, “Freedom”
and “Coercion”—Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 571–73
(1985); see also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule:
Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 465, 468 (2005) (“Basic questions concerning voluntariness and free
will—e.g., whether they exist, and if so, when they exist—have puzzled philosophers for centuries and represent one of history’s Gordian knots.”). In criminal law, the debate arises in contexts such as blackmail and rape. See, e.g.,
Donald A. Dripps, More on Distinguishing Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and
Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1460, 1463–68
(1993); Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 554 (1983);
Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39,
172–77 (1998); James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 671 (1984).
104. Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440,
447 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (contrasting threats from offers
based on whether the action’s consequences are worse or better than the original course of events).
105. See Kreimer, supra note 80, at 1352; Sullivan, supra note 80, at 1436,
1448 & n.142.
106. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 335 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our hardy forebears, who thought of compulsion in terms of the
rack and oaths forced by the power of law, would not have viewed the drawing
of a commonsense inference as equivalent pressure.”); J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME
AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 348–49 (1986) (describing the
“old” form of trial whereby defendants that remained silent were assumed to
be unable to deny the validity of the evidence); 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 440 (London, MacMillan 1883);
John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The
Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION 82, 108 (R.H. Helmholz et al. eds., 1997).
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erally applicable rules of evidence to supply the baseline, then
Griffin also probably fails, for adverse inferences from a party’s
refusal to submit evidence in his possession are typically allowed.107 For these reasons and others, the European Court of
Human Rights has rejected claims that adverse inferences from
silence necessarily constitute “improper compulsion.”108
The only way to maintain Griffin is to supply some other
baseline—that is, some policy argument about why adverse inferences from silence are so abnormal or unnatural that we
should treat them as a type of compulsion.109 The implicit baseline policy argument of Griffin and related cases is that silence
is preferable to testimony. In Griffin, the Court struck down a
relatively minor penalty imposed on the right to silence, but in
other cases, the Court has upheld major penalties imposed on
the right to testify. For the reasons stated in Part II above, the
Supreme Court’s implicit policy preference for silence over testimony is wrong-headed.
Griffin cannot be justified as an application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. It cannot be justified by reference
to a principle of neutrality. And most centrally, it cannot be
justified in terms of the text or history of the Self-Incrimination
Clause. Given its unfounded preference for silence over testimony, it cannot be justified as a matter of policy. It ought to be
abandoned.
3. Imagining a Post-Griffin World
Overruling Griffin would throw the matter back to individual jurisdictions. Some would allow adverse inferences and
some would not.110 Some amount of national variation and experimentation would be both inevitable and beneficial.111 For
107. See infra notes 113–22 and accompanying text.
108. Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 60–64 (1996); see
Mark Berger, Europeanizing Self-Incrimination: The Right to Remain Silent
in the European Court of Human Rights, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 373–80
(2006) (discussing Great Britain’s permissive adverse inference statute and
the European Court’s rulings on adverse inferences).
109. But see Godsey, supra note 103, at 492–95 (discussing the test for
“compulsion” in formal settings as “objective” and prohibiting “objective penalties” for choosing to remain silent such as adverse inferences, termination, and
refusal of future state contracts).
110. Prior to Griffin, most American jurisdictions had passed statutes proscribing adverse inference instructions and argument. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 n.3 (1965).
111. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
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the first time in decades, state courts and legislators would
have the opportunity to reconsider their rules regarding adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence. In deciding what
course to choose, they should be guided by general principles of
evidence law.
a. Adverse Inferences and Privileges
Two well-established principles of evidence law provide
support for the idea that a prosecutor should be able to argue
adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence. The first principle is that when a party fails to produce evidence in its control, it is reasonable for the opposing party to argue an adverse
inference.112 This principle dates at least to the early eighteenth century and the chimney sweep’s jewel case.113 As the
Supreme Court put it in Graves v. United States:
The rule even in criminal cases is that if a party has it peculiarly
within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it creates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable.114

The Graves “missing witness” rule retains vitality today.115
The related law of spoliation allows an adverse inference to be
drawn from a party’s destruction of physical evidence.116 Courts
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). For academic discussions about the virtues of federalism in fostering
innovation and experimentation, see, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1445–48 (1992); Charles Fried, Federalism—Why Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2–3 (1982); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18 (2003).
112. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 264, at 220–26 (Kenneth S. Broun ed.,
6th ed. 2006).
113. Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (K.B.); see also 1
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 285, at 368–70 (Boston, Little et al. 1904) (discussing court
decisions following Armory). For early American statements of the rule, see,
for example, Gordon v. People, 33 N.Y. 501, 509 (1865).
114. 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893).
115. See United States v. Luvene, 245 F.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 2001); Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2000); Shank v.
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 128 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Glenn, 64 F.3d 706, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Spinosa, 982 F.2d
620, 632 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 698 (5th Cir.
1984); State v. Malave, 737 A.2d 442, 452 (Conn. 1999); State v. Padilla, 552
P.2d 357, 364 (Haw. 1976); People v. Savinon, 791 N.E.2d 401, 403–04 (N.Y.
2003).
116. See Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2007); Morris v.
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have thus recognized that a party’s destruction of evidence or
refusal to produce evidence has evidentiary significance.
The second principle is that a party’s silence, like other
forms of conduct, may constitute an admission. “When a statement is made in the presence of a party containing assertions of
facts which, if untrue, the party would under all the circumstances naturally be expected to deny, failure to speak has traditionally been received as an admission.”117
Indeed, “[s]ilence is often evidence of the most persuasive
character.”118 Thus, for the purposes of the hearsay rule, silence
can constitute an admission in some circumstances.119 Silence
can also count as a prior inconsistent statement, both for hearsay and impeachment purposes, when a party refuses to answer questions prior to trial but then testifies at trial.120 Consistent with these general principles, it is reasonable in at least
some circumstances to treat a defendant’s silence at trial as a
type of admission from which an adverse inference can be
drawn.
The application of those two principles is admittedly more
complicated, however, when it comes to privileged materials.
There is substantial evidence-law authority for the proposition
that an adverse inference may be drawn from a party’s failure
Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2004); Aramburu v. Boeing Co.,
112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997); Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills
Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J.); Brown v. Hamid,
856 S.W.2d 51, 56–57 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.16, at 449–50 & n.30 (4th ed. 2005).
117. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 262, at 212.
118. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1923)
(Brandeis, J.).
119. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (excluding adoptive admissions from
the definition of hearsay); Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980);
United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 76 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Tocco,
135 F.3d 116, 128–29 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 505
(9th Cir. 1991); White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049,
1063 (W.D. Mo. 1985); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE § 8.29, at 778 (3d ed. 2003); Henry S. Hilles, Jr., Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 210, 229 (1963); see also United States v.
Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, (1975) (“Failure to contest an assertion . . . is considered evidence of acquiescence . . . if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in question.”).
120. FED. R. EVID. 613 & 801(d)(1)(A); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
235–38 (1980); United States v. Vaughn, 370 F.3d 1049, 1053 n.2 (10th Cir.
2004); United States v. Matlock, 109 F.3d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Strother, 49 F.3d 869, 874 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Carr, 584
F.2d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 1978); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.40,
at 522–23.
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to produce privileged material, so long as the exercise of the
privilege is within the party’s control.121 There is also some authority, however, for the contrary principle that an adverse inference may never be drawn from a party’s failure to produce
evidence protected by a privilege.122 Jurisdictions that maintain
the latter rule might keep the Griffin rule as a matter of evidence law even if it were abandoned as a matter of constitutional law.
But there is good reason for treating the privilege against
self-incrimination differently from statutory privileges such as
the attorney-client privilege. Statutory privileges, for the most
part, operate to protect communication in important personal
or professional relationships such as the attorney-client relationship, the physician-patient relationship, or the marital relationship. Courts establishing a “no adverse inference” rule for
statutory privileges have done so on the basis that adverse inferences could chill communication and thus undermine those
important confidential relationships.123
The same rationale does not apply to the privilege against
self-incrimination, which does not protect confidential communications. Its purpose (though disputed and never clearly understood) is to prevent coercion and unreliable confessions, and
perhaps to promote some measure of individual autonomy and
dignity.124 Allowing adverse inferences to be drawn from a defendant’s failure to testify would not significantly undermine
those goals. Adverse inferences would create an additional disincentive for exercising the right to silence, but that would
simply mean that more defendants would exercise the right to
testify, which is also autonomy-enhancing.
121. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1977); Phillips v. Chase,
87 N.E. 755, 758 (Mass. 1909); see also MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 233 (1942).
122. See John Deere Co. v. Epstein, 769 P.2d 766, 768–70 (Or. 1989) (discussing proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
§ 74.1, at 347 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).
123. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,
383 F.3d 1337, 1344 –45 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Sanchez,
176 F.3d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1999).
124. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964) (discussing the various values served by the self-incrimination clause); Akhil Reed
Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 922–25 (1995) (arguing that the
primary purpose of the clause is ensuring reliable trial evidence); see also Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 309, 313 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court has employed three
theories to justify excluding confessions: ensuring reliability of confessions,
preventing abuse by police, and protecting defendants’ autonomy).
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In short, even those jurisdictions that do not allow adverse
inferences based on the exercise of a statutory privilege should
consider allowing adverse inferences based on the exercise of
the self-incrimination privilege. As a few states have already
recognized, the policy arguments for the former do not apply to
the latter.125 The importance of defendants’ testimony at trial
justifies incentives for testifying and disincentives for remaining silent. Adverse inferences from silence make sense as a
matter of policy and as a matter of evidence law.
b. Argument and Instruction
There is a common-sense inference from silence to guilt. As
Justice Scalia argued in Mitchell, “If I ask my son whether he
saw a movie I had forbidden him to watch, and he remains silent, the import of his silence is clear.”126 But it is important to
remember that silence does not always raise an inference of
guilt. Silence is ambiguous, and in some situations, defendants
have entirely innocent reasons for remaining silent.127 In fact,
in some situations silence might raise a positively exculpatory
inference, as where a defendant declines to take the stand
simply because the prosecution’s case is so weak that there is
no need to respond.
For that reason, the significance of silence is a matter that
both parties should be allowed argue to the jury (subject to important caveats outlined below).128 The prosecution should be
allowed to argue that the defendant’s silence constitutes a tacit
admission, while the defense should be allowed to argue a contrary inference. The strength of the opposing arguments will
vary depending on the circumstances of the case, and the jury
can decide which is more persuasive.
A more difficult question is whether, in addition to allowing argument by the parties, trial courts should give an in125. See, e.g., WIS. R. EVID. 905.13 (forbidding adverse inferences based on
statutory privileges, but allowing adverse inferences based on the exercise of
the self-incrimination privilege in civil cases).
126. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Charles R. Nesson & Michael J. Leotta, The Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Cross-Examination, 85 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1674 –78 (1997) (discussing the logic of adverse inferences from silence).
127. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1975); United States
v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Zaccaria, 240
F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2001); Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1995).
128. See infra Part II.A.3.c.
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struction informing the jury that an adverse inference is allowed.129 An adverse inference instruction would stamp the
court’s imprimatur on the prosecution’s argument.130 That
would have the beneficial effect of encouraging more defendants to testify.131 But any instruction that captured the
truth—that silence sometimes suggests guilt but sometimes
does not—might be so watered down that it would have little
effect.132 It would also add more bulk to jury instructions that
are already too long.133
Moreover, as a general matter, permissive-inference instructions are unnecessary where the significance of evidence
can be appropriately assessed by the jury without any extra assistance.134 The law of evidence regarding flight provides a good
analogy. Like silence, flight is a type of conduct that in some

129. See Julie E. McDonald, Drawing an Inference from the Failure to Produce a Knowledgeable Witness: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations,
61 CAL. L. REV. 1422, 1430 (1973) (“[T]here is a difference between what the
jury might infer on its own, which can never be completely controlled, and
what the jury might think when the absence of certain evidence is highlighted
by . . . the judge’s instructions.”).
130. United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1146 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting
how particular jury instructions can have the unwanted result of putting the
court’s imprimatur on one party’s theory of the case); Hous. 21, L.L.C. v. Atl.
Home Builders Co., 289 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2002) (same); Bird v. Ferry,
497 F.2d 112, 119 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); see Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288,
302 n.20 (1981) (“[T]he influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily
and properly of great weight. . . .” (quoting Starr v. United States, 153 U.S.
614, 626 (1894))).
131. Arguably, if a jurisdiction decides to give an adverse inference instruction when defendants refuse to testify, it also should give a positive inference
instruction when defendants do take the stand. But see United States v. McQuarry, 726 F.2d 401, 402 (8th Cir. 1984) (refusing to give a consciousness of
innocence instruction based on lack of flight); United States v. Telfaire, 469
F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. Scott, 446 F.2d 509,
510 (9th Cir. 1971) (same).
132. Permissive-inference instructions regarding flight or missing witnesses typically take pains to point out that an adverse inference is not the
only inference that may be drawn. See KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.08, at 300, § 14.15, at 337 (5th ed.
2000).
133. See Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (1988)
(arguing that jury instructions are “lengthy” and confusing).
134. See State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 186 n.7 (Minn. 2002) (“Permissive-inference instructions are also unnecessary in that ‘[i]f the rational connection between facts presented and facts inferred is derived from common
sense and experience, the matter can normally be left to the jury’s judgment
upon general instructions.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
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circumstances suggests consciousness of guilt.135 Of course,
flight does not always suggest guilt—in some cases a defendant
flees for innocent reasons.136 In part for that reason, a number
of appellate courts have sensibly held that permissive-inference
instructions on flight are disfavored, and that the matter
should be left to the arguments of counsel.137
Courts should apply the same approach to evidence of a defendant’s silence. With such evidence, as with evidence of a defendant’s flight, “[t]he interest of justice is perhaps best served
if this matter is reserved for counsel’s argument, with little if
any comment by the bench.”138
c. Fair Response and Unfair Prejudice
As discussed above, a defendant will sometimes decline to
testify for entirely innocent reasons, and the defense should
have an opportunity to argue against any adverse inference
that may be drawn from this silence. The matter should be argued by both sides, and the jury should decide which argument
is more persuasive. This approach, however, can only work
where both sides have a fair opportunity to present an argument on the subject.139 In some cases, a defendant will not be
135. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 157 (2d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996, 1000–01 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 581 (9th Cir. 1988); People v. Howard, 175 P.3d 13, 27
(Cal. 2008); see 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 263, at 217.
136. “[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.”
Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896); accord United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. HernandezBermudez, 857 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1988); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d
849, 869 (Mich. 1996); State v. Patton, 930 P.2d 635, 644 (Mont. 1996).
137. State v. Wrenn, 584 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Idaho 1978); Dill v. State, 741
N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind. 2001); State v. Bone, 429 N.W.2d 123, 125–27 (Iowa
1988); State v. Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. 2006); State v. Hall, 991
P.2d 929, 930 (Mont. 1999); State v. Stilling 590 P.2d 1223, 1230 (Or. 1979);
State v. Grant, 272 S.E.2d 169, 171 (S.C. 1980); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 4.4, at 164 (stating that the “better practice” is to
“forgo any jury instruction on the point”).
138. United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf.
United States v. Hankins, 931 F.2d 1256, 1263 (8th Cir. 1991) (asserting that
flight evidence is only “marginally probative” and that district courts may
choose not to mention it in jury instructions).
139. One way that a party’s evidence can be unfairly prejudicial is if the
opposing party has no opportunity to respond. See United States v. Lee, 274
F.3d 485, 495–96 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803,
823–24 (4th Cir. 2000); Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297, 301 (Ill. 1988); Gen.
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able to explain his decision to remain silent without revealing
unfairly prejudicial information to the jury. In such cases, the
entire matter should be removed from consideration, and no
argument should be allowed on either side.140
Once again, cases involving flight evidence provide a good
source of guidance. Ordinarily, both sides may argue that the
jury should draw contrary inferences from flight.141 But in some
cases, a defendant’s explanation for his flight will reveal unfairly prejudicial information—for example, if the defendant fled
based on fear of apprehension for a separate offense.142 In such
cases, the court may not instruct the jury to consider the defendant’s flight as evidence of his guilt, and the prosecution is not
allowed to argue as much.143
The same general rules should apply to evidence of a defendant’s silence at trial. Thus, for example, if a defendant declines to take the stand in order to avoid the prosecution’s use
of other crimes for impeachment,144 the prosecution should not
be able to argue that the defendant’s silence constitutes an admission. In that situation, the defendant would not have an opportunity to explain his silence without revealing unfairly prejudicial information.145 Prosecutors should therefore be forced
Motors Corp. v. Seay, 879 A.2d 1049, 1062 & n.19 (Md. 2005); see also MUEL& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 4.9, at 173 (“[S]urprise may sometimes
be a factor in a finding that evidence will result in unfair prejudice . . . .”).
140. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Impoverishing the Trier of Fact: Excluding the Proponent’s Expert Testimony Due to the Opponent’s Inability to Afford
Rebuttal Evidence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 317, 320–21 (2007) (asserting that the
risk of a jury overvaluing certain evidence is “obviously magnified when the
opponent cannot afford a rebuttal”); cf. United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d
1382, 1394 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Unless the jury knows exactly why a party did not
call a witness, it cannot fully evaluate the meaning of the witness’s absence.”).
141. Cf. United States v. Obi, 239 F.3d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that
evidence was presented as to what inferences the jury could draw).
142. See United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 740 (4th Cir. 1976); 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 263, at 218 (“Particularly troublesome are the cases where defendant flees when sought to be arrested for
another crime, is wanted for another crime, or is not shown to know that he or
she is suspected of the particular crime.”(footnotes omitted)).
143. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1977);
Foutz, 540 F.2d at 739–40; Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988, 997 (Fla. 1997);
Mack v. State, 650 So. 2d 1289, 1308–10 (Miss. 1994); Guy v. State, 839 P.2d
578, 583 (Nev. 1992); 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5181, at 261–62 & n.50 (1978 & Supp.
2008).
144. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (allowing the admission of evidence of other
crimes for impeachment purposes); infra Part II.B.
145. Cf. Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: PsychoLER
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to decide between introducing evidence of other crimes for impeachment purposes and arguing an adverse inference from a
defendant’s failure to testify; they should not be allowed to do
both, and a judge should address the matter efficiently, before
or during trial.146 Consistent with general principles of evidence law,147 a prosecutor should only be allowed to argue an
adverse inference if the defendant has a fair opportunity to respond.
d. A Return to the Baseline
Griffin’s “no adverse inference rule”148 marks a departure
from generally applicable rules of evidence. Measured from
that baseline, Griffin offers criminal defendants an extra subsidy for remaining silent.149 Griffin is dubious as a matter of
constitutional interpretation, and as a policy matter it is unwise to subsidize silence. Griffin should be abandoned.
In the absence of a constitutional command, states could
experiment with different approaches to silence. General principles of evidence law, such as those adopted in cases of a defendant’s flight,150 provide a good rough guide. The best result
would be the following simple rule: “Unless the defense would
not have a fair opportunity to respond, the prosecution may arBayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 678–
80 (1991) (discussing the relationship between Rule 609 evidence and the Griffin rule, and arguing that character evidence of the accused should not be allowed and that Griffin may require a reexamination).
146. Courts endorse a similar approach when a party seeks to draw an adverse inference from the opponent’s failure to call a witness:
The better practice . . . is for the party seeking to obtain a charge encompassing such an inference to advise the trial judge and counsel
out of the presence of the jury, at the close of his opponent’s case, of
his intent to so request and demonstrating the names or classes of
available persons not called and the reasons for the conclusion that
they have superior knowledge of the facts. This would accord the party accused of nonproduction the opportunity of either calling the designated witness or demonstrating to the court by argument or proof
the reason for the failure to call. Depending upon the particular circumstances thus disclosed, the trial court may determine that the
failure to call the witness raised no inference, or an unfavorable one,
and hence whether any reference in the summation or a charge is
warranted.
People v. Ford, 754 P.2d 168, 178 n.8 (Cal. 1988) (quoting State v. Clawans,
183 A.2d 77, 82 (N.J. 1962)).
147. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
148. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–14 (1965).
149. Cf. id. at 613–14 (prohibiting prosecution from commenting on silence,
thereby encouraging a defendant’s avoidance of the witness stand).
150. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
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gue that the defendant’s silence raises an inference of guilt, but
the court should not endorse the inference.” That rule would
conform to the larger landscape of evidence law, and it would
encourage more defendants to testify.
B. PROPOSAL TWO: ABANDONING THE GORDON TEST FOR RULE
609
Like Griffin’s “no adverse inference” rule,151 many other
rules raise the relative cost of testimony. Of these, one of the
most powerful is Federal Rule of Evidence 609. American law
generally excludes evidence of a defendant’s bad character, including evidence of his prior criminal convictions.152 Rule 609 is
an exception to the character evidence rule—it allows the admission of some convictions as impeachment evidence if the defendant takes the stand.153 The accepted theory of the Rule 609
exception is that when a defendant takes the stand, his prior
convictions can be used to demonstrate his character for untruthfulness as a witness but not his character for criminality
as a defendant.154
Thus, under the accepted theory of the rule, if a defendant
testifies, the prosecutor may use his prior rape conviction to
show that he is a liar, but not that he is a rapist. That any human fact finder could so limit the evidence is dubious,155 and a
substantial body of empirical literature questions the Rule’s
premise.156 Several commentators, characterizing the theory of

151. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613–14.
152. See FED. R. EVID. 404; Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–
82 (1997); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 188.
153. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3); FED. R. EVID. 609(a); 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 194.
154. See United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens,
J.).
155 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.29, at 492–93 (discussing
the difficulties with Rule 609 impeachment); Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock
and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction,
42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1997) (same); H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character,
and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776,
792–93 (1993) (same).
156. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand
on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to
Testify and on Trial Outcomes (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07012, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998529 (summarizing social
science research demonstrating that jurors routinely misuse Rule 609 evidence as evidence of the defendant’s general propensity for guilt rather than
just evidence of truthfulness).
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Rule 609 as a rank fiction, even call for its repeal.157 Whatever
the merits of that argument, for my purposes it is enough to
say that courts expand this arguably unwise exception to the
character rule beyond all sense of proportion.
Much of the fault for this situation lies at the feet of Gordon v. United States.158 In Gordon, then-Judge Warren Burger
set forth a five-factor test governing the admission of prior convictions for impeachment.159 The five factors are: (1) the nature
of the prior offense; (2) the staleness of the prior offense; (3) the
similarity of the prior offense to the charged offense; (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of
the credibility issue.160 The Gordon test is very influential;161
most federal circuits and many state courts have adopted the
test, in whole or in part, to interpret Rule 609 or the corresponding state version of that Rule.162
157. See Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 4 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction Between Personality and Situation, 43
DUKE L.J. 816, 831 (1994); cf. Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J.
135, 135–36, 138 (1989) (arguing for amendment of Rule 609, but not outright
appeal). But see Roger C. Park, Impeachment with Evidence of Prior Convictions, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 793, 813–17 (2008) (offering a defense of allowing evidence of prior convictions as impeachment evidence).
158. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
159. See id. at 939–41. In Gordon, Judge Burger did not explicitly number
the factors, but the test is referred to as a five-factor test. See, e.g., Roderick
Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence:
A Suggested Approach to Applying the “Balancing” Provision of Rule 609(a), 31
SYRACUSE L. REV. 907, 942 (1980).
160. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 939–41.
161. See United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 617–18 (2d Cir. 2005);
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.31, at 496–99; 2 STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1033 (7th ed. 1998).
For an extensive discussion of jurisdictional variations on the test governing
the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, see generally
Dannye R. Holley, Judicial Anarchy: The Admission of Convictions to Impeach: State Supreme Courts’ Interpretative Standards, 1998-2004, 2007 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 307.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Gant, 396 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905, 908–09 (11th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Meyers, 952 F.2d 914, 916–17 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671, 695 n.30 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Grandmont, 680
F.2d 867, 872 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982); Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761
n.4 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1209 (D.C. Cir.
1980); United States v. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50, 53 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977); Jackson v.
State, 668 A.2d 8, 14 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 417 N.E.2d 950, 955
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The widespread adoption of Gordon, however, does a disservice to Rule 609 and to evidence law. The five-factor Gordon
test is both overinclusive and underinclusive. In structure, it
has obscured the balancing test prescribed by the Rule. On the
whole, it has prevented courts from recognizing simple propositions that should guide—and limit—application of Rule 609.
1. Overinclusiveness
The Gordon test is overinclusive. It sets forth five factors
that courts applying Rule 609 should consider, but four of those
five factors should bear little or no weight in a proper Rule 609
analysis.
The first Gordon factor is the nature of the prior conviction.163 The principle suggested in Gordon is that certain
crimes reflect strongly on credibility while other crimes reflect
on credibility only weakly.164 But the application of this factor
has often befuddled courts. It is often difficult to classify crimes
as one or the other.
For example, which crime reflects more on credibility, theft
or rape? On one hand, theft might be more sneaky, more suggestive of mendacity, and thus more probative of credibility. On
the other hand, rape is a more serious crime and a more serious
transgression of social norms. Compared to a defendant who
has only committed a relatively minor felony theft, a defendant
who has committed a crime as serious as rape might be more
likely to commit perjury. Courts scatter on these issues in part
because the question itself is muddled by substantial incoherence.165
(Mass. 1981); State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 537–38 (Minn. 1978); Peterson
v. State, 518 So. 2d 632, 636 (Miss. 1987); State v. Eugene, 340 N.W.2d 18, 34
(N.D. 1983); State v. McClure, 692 P.2d 579, 585 (Or. 1984); Theus v. State,
845 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,
1334 (Utah 1986).
For variations on the Gordon test, see, for example, People v. Castro, 696
P.2d 111, 114 (Cal. 1985); Label Sys. Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703,
720–21 (Conn. 2004); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ill. 2001); State v.
Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Iowa 1997); State v. Smith, 553 N.W.2d 824, 827
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
163. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940.
164. Id.; see also Estrada, 430 F.3d at 617–19; Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d
1159, 1174 –75 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting People v. Beagle, 492 P.2d 1, 7–8 (Cal.
1972)); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 516 (Mich. 1988); 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.05[3][b] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 2008).
165. Some courts, for example, hold that rape convictions are “not highly
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Admittedly, there are good arguments that some crimes do,
in fact, have more probative value than others. For example,
because perjury involves intentional wrongdoing, prior crimes
involving intentional wrongdoing may reflect more on character
for truthfulness than prior crimes involving mere recklessness
or negligence. It could be thus be argued under the first Gordon
factor that intentional murder is more probative of truthfulness
than vehicular manslaughter. But even if there is some real difference in the probative value of various non-crimen falsi felonies, it is questionable whether there is very much. When it
comes to the first Gordon factor, the game probably is not
worth the candle. The first Gordon factor receives more attention than it deserves.
The second Gordon factor is the remoteness of the prior
conviction.166 Gordon suggests the principle that a nine-yearold offense is less probative than a one-year-old offense, and
thus that the latter should be admitted more readily than the
former.167 But prejudicial impact can decline along with probative value.168 A nine-year-old offense is less probative than a
one-year-old offense, but it also creates less potential for unfair
prejudice.169 The second Gordon factor also receives more attention than it deserves; arguably, it should be excluded altogether.170
probative of credibility.” Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th Cir.
1985). Other courts disagree. See, e.g., State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 587
(Minn. 1998). Some courts hold that drug convictions have only slight probative value. See, e.g., Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 56 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1273, 1276 (5th Cir.
1977). Other courts disagree. See, e.g., United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d
864, 873–74 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828
(2d Cir. 1977) (arguing that while “mere narcotics possession” has relatively
little probative worth, drug smuggling “ranks relatively high on the scale of
veracity-related crimes”).
166. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940.
167. See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2005); Lipscomb,
702 F.2d at 1062; United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 1980);
Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940; State v. Gardner, 433 A.2d 249, 252 (Vt. 1981);
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.31, at 498; 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 164, § 609.05[3][c].
168. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 4.16, at 202 (“Ironically, the risk of unfair prejudice sometimes increases even as probative worth
increases.”).
169. United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110, 120 n.11 (1st Cir. 2000)
(“The older the evidence that a defendant was a bad character, the weaker the
force of inference about his present character or propensity.”).
170. Of course, Rule 609(b) creates a general rule of exclusion for crimes
older than ten years. Some courts have read that provision as expressing a
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The fourth and fifth Gordon factors are the most puzzling
of all. The fourth factor is the importance of the defendant’s
testimony.171 Gordon suggests that if a defendant’s testimony is
important, then impeachment might deter him from taking the
stand and should not be allowed.172 The fifth factor—the centrality of the defendant’s credibility173—suggests that if a defendant’s credibility is important, then impeachment is also
important and should be allowed.174
The fourth and fifth factors do not really address probative
value or potential for unfair prejudice, at least as those terms
are usually conceived in evidence law. Rather, they simply reflect the competing policy arguments of the Rule’s internal
compromise.175 It is sometimes useful to consider an evidence
rule’s rationale when applying the rule, but in this case, the
competing policy considerations simply cancel one another out.
As a defendant’s testimony becomes more important, his credibility also becomes more important.176 So as the fifth factor
pulls more strongly for exclusion of prior convictions, the fourth
factor pulls more strongly for admission.177 At best, the fourth
and fifth factors are mostly meaningless. At worst, they confuse
courts and distract from the real issues that should be considered.
In sum, these four Gordon factors have little or no value in
assessing the probative value or prejudicial effect of a prior
conviction admitted for impeachment. The Gordon test is thus

conclusion that probative value fades more quickly than prejudicial effect. See,
e.g., Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1062 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b)
and reviewing its legislative history). By that logic, however, courts should also consider the punishment authorized for the prior offense, as well as the age
of the offender at the time of the prior offense. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1),
609(d).
171. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940–41 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
172. Id.; see also United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1977);
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 1987); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 119, § 6.31, at 499; 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note
164, § 609.05[3][e].
173. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 941 n.11.
174. Id.
175. Surratt, supra note 159, at 943.
176. United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 54 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 16 (Md. 1995); State v. McClure, 692 P.2d 579, 591
(Or. 1984).
177. Surratt, supra note 159, at 945; Bruce P. Garren, Note, Impeachment
By Prior Conviction: Adjusting to Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 64 CORNELL L.
REV. 416, 435 n.114 (1979).
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overinclusive—it focuses courts’ attention on factors that have
little or no evidentiary salience.
2. Underinclusiveness
The Gordon test is also underinclusive. The five-factor test
ignores two critical factors that should be considered by courts
weighing the admission of prior convictions.178
First, the Gordon test ignores the availability of other
means of impeachment. A central principle of evidence law is
that the probative value of a given piece of evidence depends on
the availability of other evidence to prove the same point.179 As
the Supreme Court put it, no piece of evidence is an island—
when we measure probative value, we must measure “discounted probative value.”180
That principle should be recognized in the Rule 609 weighing process just as it is in the Rule 403 weighing process.181 If
the prosecution has other means to impeach a defendant, then
the discounted probative value of proffered 609 convictions decreases.182 If the prosecution can, for example, call a witness
178. To be fair to Gordon, it must be noted that Judge Burger explicitly
cautioned that “there are many other factors that may be relevant in deciding
whether or not to exclude prior convictions in a particular case.” Gordon, 383
F.2d at 940. Courts since then, however, have largely ignored that note of caution, settling instead for the relative security of the five-factor test derived
from Gordon. But see State v. Trejo, 825 P.2d 1252, 1255–56 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991) (noting that these factors “are not to be considered mechanically or in
isolation”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.31, at 500 (“No
thoughtful person is likely to be satisfied with any list of factors.”).
179. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (stating that the
“availability of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor” to consider in a 403 balancing test); 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 143, § 5250,
at 546–47 (“The probative worth of any particular bit of evidence is obviously
affected by the scarcity or abundance of other evidence on the same point.”).
For examples of this principle in court opinions, see United States v.
Stout, 509 F.3d 796, 800 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ali, 493 F.3d 387,
391 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir.
2007); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 51 (1st Cir. 2001); People v. Walker,
812 N.E.2d 339, 347–48 (Ill. 2004); State v. Humphrey, 412 So. 2d 507, 521 n.2
(La. 1982); People v. Hine, 650 N.W.2d 659, 662–63 (Mich. 2002).
180. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191 (1997).
181. See 2 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 161, at 1033 (discussing a proposed amendment to Rule 609 that would have required consideration of other
evidence offered to impeach).
182. This principle has been suggested by a few judges. See United States
v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 2004) (McKee, J., concurring); United
States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1985); People v. Rist, 545 P.2d
833, 839 (Cal. 1976); State v. Martin, 704 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Iowa 2005); State
v. Gardner, 433 A.2d 249, 252 (Vt. 1981).
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who will offer opinion testimony that the defendant has character for untruthfulness,183 then the prosecution need not admit
the defendant’s prior rape for impeachment. Likewise, if the
prosecution has admitted one conviction for impeachment, then
it need not admit a second and third.
Second, the Gordon test ignores the relative severity of the
prior conviction. It correctly recognizes under the third factor
that if a prior conviction is similar to the charged offense, there
is a greater potential for unfair prejudice.184 But the Gordon
test fails to recognize that if a prior conviction is particularly
lurid or inflammatory, there is also a greater potential for unfair prejudice. When analyzing the evidence of other acts covered by Rule 404(b), courts have consistently held that the inflammatory or lurid nature of the evidence weighs against
admission.185 Moreover, as California state courts have recognized with unusual clarity, relative severity is particularly important.186
A defendant charged with murder will not be much prejudiced by the admission of a prior burglary conviction. Few jurors would convict a man of murder simply because they knew
him to be a burglar. The potential for prejudice is much higher
when the crimes are reversed—a defendant charged with burglary will be greatly prejudiced by the admission of a prior
murder conviction.187 In that scenario, the potential for preven183. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked
or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation . . . .”).
184. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Stout, 509 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 994 –95 (8th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 470 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Virgin Islands v.
Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 917 (3d Cir. 1992)); United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d
1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Harvey, 991 F.2d 981, 996–97 (2d
Cir. 1993); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 190, at 768 (discussing, in the 404(b) context, how the heinousness of the previous crime is an important factor to consider); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 4.16,
at 201–02 (same).
186. See People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757, 772 (Cal. 1994) (“The testimony
describing defendant’s uncharged acts, however, was no stronger and no more
inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses.”); People v.
Branch, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870, 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“The first factor we
must consider is whether the uncharged offenses were more inflammatory
than the charged offenses.”); see also State v. Beck, 745 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987); Marc v. State, 166 S.W.3d 767, 776 (Tex. App. 2005).
187. Compare People v. Ortiz, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 470, 479 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (affirming murder conviction where the state admitted evidence of prior
crimes of drunk driving and speeding), with People v. Harris, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d
689, 692–93, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing sexual assault conviction
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tative conviction (a type of pro-prosecution nullification) is
much higher.
These principles comport with common sense and with the
larger landscape of evidence law. Courts applying Gordon,
however, have largely ignored them. Having enthusiastically
adopted the five-factor test, they stopped looking for considerations beyond those five mentioned in one case decided forty
years ago by Judge Burger.
3. Lost Balance
Aside from any individual factor, the Gordon test also distorts the underlying mechanics of Rule 609. Rule 609 is, by its
terms, a balancing test: courts are instructed to admit prior
crimes if and only if they determine “that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused.”188 Those words sound familiar, and for good reason—
they are borrowed from Rule 403, the all-encompassing fallback
rule that allows for discretionary exclusion of relevant evidence.189 In their eagerness to run through the five-box checklist of the Gordon test, courts forget that their ultimate task is
to balance probative value against the potential for prejudice.
They forget that their task is simply to perform a version of the
403 balancing test.190
Courts have also forgotten that the 609 balancing test is a
modified version of the 403 balancing test—and modified in a
where the state admitted evidence of a prior crime involving sexual torture
and mutilation).
188. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
189. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence
403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 497, 497 (1983) (discussing the importance of Rule 403); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of
Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 905–06 (1988) (describing Rule 403 as “a cornerstone of the Federal Rules [of Evidence]”); Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in
the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 1097, 1120 (1985) (describing Rule 403 as the “most important” exclusionary rule in the Rules of Evidence); Kathryn Cameron Walton, Note, An Exercise in Sound Discretion: Old Chief v. United States, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1053,
1053 (1998) (“Rule 403 primarily serves as a guide for situations in which no
other specific rules control.”).
190. See, e.g., State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 483 n.9 (Wis. 2004) (discussing state law analogues to Rules 403 and 609 and explaining that Gordonlike factors “are merely elements to be considered” when balancing probative
value against potential prejudice (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 904.03, 906.09(2)
(West 2000))).
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way that is tilted more in favor of exclusion.191 While Rule 403
only allows exclusion if the potential for prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value,192 Rule 609 only allows admission if the probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.193 That difference cannot be reduced to any bright-line
rules of application, but it should not be forgotten.
The proper metaphoric framework for applying Rule 609 is
not any checklist of factors, whether numbered five or otherwise. The proper metaphoric framework is a scale with two
sides.194 On one side is the probative value, which will vary
somewhat depending on the overall evidentiary posture of the
case. On the other side is the potential for unfair prejudice,
which will vary substantially depending on the overall evidentiary posture of the case.195 Courts should simply do what the
text of the Rule demands: compare one side of the scale to the
other.
In practice, especially as its application has calcified over
the decades, the Gordon test has resulted in the admission of
too many prior convictions for impeachment.196
191. See United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 160 (1st Cir. 2004); State v.
Martin, 704 N.W.2d 674, 676 n.1 (Iowa 2005) (addressing state analogues to
the federal rules); RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE 413 (3d ed. 2002); Uviller, supra note 155, at 799–800.
192. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
(emphasis added)); United States v. Jimenez, 507 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he Rule 403 analysis is confined to ‘unfair’ prejudice, and the scales do not
tip in favor of exclusion unless the probative value is ‘substantially outweighed.’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403)).
193. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (“[E]vidence that an accused has been convicted
of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused . . . .”).
194. Courts and commentators frequently invoke the scale metaphor when
discussing the Rule 403 balancing test. See, e.g., Jimenez, 507 F.3d at 18;
Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 566 n.18 (5th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Davis, 181 F.3d 147, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
195. The case-specific, context-specific nature of the inquiry is precisely
why the Federal Rules of Evidence grant discretion to trial judges. See David
P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937,
959 (1990); Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 413–14 (1989); Eleanor Swift, One Hundred
Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437, 2443
(2000); Waltz, supra note 189, at 1100.
196. Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion
and the Politics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2296–97 (1994) (“Too
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4. Replacing Gordon
The five-factor Gordon test should be abandoned in favor of
a two-sided balancing test consistent with the text and purpose
of Rule 609. That balancing test should be guided by general
principles of evidence law and common sense, both of which
have been lacking in courts’ application of Gordon.
a. Assessing Probative Value
On the probative side of the scale, two key points should be
remembered. First, in every criminal case, the defendant’s testimony is important, and therefore any evidence impeaching
his testimony will have significant probative value. Defendants
take the stand to deny guilt. If that denial is believed, the jury
will acquit. If some evidence can show that the defendant is not
believable, either in this instance or in general, it will substantially affect the result. Evidence impeaching a defendantwitness has an inherently high probative value.
But that point must be recognized along with a second
countervailing point: in every criminal case, a defendant’s interest in the outcome is obvious, therefore lessening the need
for other impeachment evidence.197 Criminal defendants have a
huge incentive to lie, and jurors are well aware of that huge incentive. Prosecutors may impeach defendants by pointing out
their bias and self-interest.198
Because that means of impeachment is so readily available, the marginal value of additional impeachment evidence is
diminished.199 The “discounted probative value” of a defendant’s prior conviction is inherently low.
Beyond those two points, there may not be much else to say
about the probative value of Rule 609 evidence in any given
case. It is doubtful whether much turns on the nature of the
prior conviction. It is reasonable to argue that a rape conviction
often [courts] make the mistake of assuming that the uncertainties of the
Rule’s text provide license to exercise virtually unrestricted discretion.”).
197. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 39, at 173 (“The witness’s self-interest is evident when he is himself a party . . . .”).
198. See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6094 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing showings of bias
as one of the prototypical forms of impeachment).
199. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1527 (1999) (“There is no basis for supposing that recidivists are more likely than first-time offenders to lie; both are criminals, and
the incentive of a criminal to lie is unrelated to whether he has committed one
crime or more than one.”).
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shows more about a person’s truthfulness than a theft conviction, and it is reasonable to argue the opposite. In either case,
the fit between the fact of the prior conviction and the current
assessment of credibility is somewhat loose. At bottom, the
most sensible conclusion is that all (non-crimen falsi)200 crimes
reflect somewhat on truthfulness. Nevertheless, they do not reflect a great deal, and no one type of crime reflects a great deal
more than another.
In short, all 609(a)(1) crimes have some probative value,
but their probative value is inherently somewhat limited.
b. Assessing Prejudice
On the prejudice side of the scale, there are again two key
points to bear in mind. First, if a prior conviction is similar to
the charged offense, the potential for unfair prejudice is inherently high. Gordon correctly recognized that point,201 but it
has been too often forgotten by courts since.202
Second, if a prior conviction is much more serious than the
charged offense, the potential for unfair prejudice is also high.
Where a prior conviction is more inflammatory and frightening
than the present offense, there is a greater danger that the jury
will be distracted by the former and lose focus of the latter.203
The risk of preventative conviction increases with the severity
of the prior conviction.
In short, all 609(a)(1) crimes have some potential for prejudice, but some crimes are much more prejudicial than others.
c. Overall Balance and Results
Within the universe of 609(a)(1) crimes, both probative
value and potential for prejudice may vary depending on the
circumstances, but the potential for prejudice varies more. Put
differently, the strength of the proper inference—regarding
character for truthfulness—varies a little from case to case,
200. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (making crimen falsi crimes admissible per
se).
201. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“As a
general guide, those convictions which are for the same crime should be admitted sparingly . . . .”).
202. See, e.g., State v. Inhot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998) (admitting
a prior rape conviction as impeachment evidence against a defendant-witness
charged with rape).
203. See Edward E. Gainor, Note, Character Evidence by Any Other
Name . . . : A Proposal To Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction Under Rule
609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 781 (1990).

2009]

MAKING DEFENDANTS SPEAK

1369

while the strength of the improper inference—regarding character for criminality—varies a great deal. With that in mind,
courts can implement a post-Gordon version of Rule 609 that is
more in keeping with general principles of evidence law and
more in keeping with the text of the Rule itself.
To some extent, the test must remain case-specific, committed to a trial judge’s discretion. But while bright-line analytic rules are probably impossible, we can settle on some general
rules of application. In general, where a prior conviction is similar to the charged offense, it should not be admitted for impeachment. Similarly, where a prior conviction is much more
serious than the charged offense, it should not be admitted for
impeachment. Finally, where a prior conviction is dissimilar to
the charged offense and less serious than the charged offense, it
should be admitted.
Results along those lines would be consistent with the text
and rationale of Rule 609. They would be consistent with principles of evidence law borrowed from Rule 403 jurisprudence
and elsewhere. They would be consistent with both common
sense and empirical evidence regarding jurors’ use of Rule 609
impeachment evidence.
Results along those lines would, on the whole, lead to the
admission of fewer prior convictions for impeachment. In so
doing, they would substantially reduce the cost of testifying
and would eliminate a barrier that prevents many defendants
from taking the stand.
C. PROPOSAL THREE: FORGOING PERJURY ENHANCEMENTS FOR
TRIAL TESTIMONY
In addition to replacing the Gordon test for Rule 609 and
abandoning Griffin’s “no adverse inference” rule, American
courts should stop imposing sentencing enhancements for defendants’ trial testimony. While such enhancements are constitutionally valid, they are not sensible as a matter of sentencing
policy. They also deter defendants from testifying, thus depriving the jury of important evidence and depriving the system of
greater legitimacy.204 Sentencing courts should thus decline to
impose perjury enhancements.
204. For a discussion of the other harms associated with perjury enhancements, see Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in
Federal Criminal Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425,
457–62 (2004).
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1. Creation and Validation of Perjury Enhancements
Like any other witness, a defendant who testifies falsely
under oath may be prosecuted for perjury. But perjury prosecutions are time-consuming and difficult; they are therefore
rare.205 In order to deter perjury, most American jurisdictions
allow judges to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on his
trial testimony.206 Thus, if a defendant testifies at trial and denies guilt, but the jury finds him guilty, the judge may impose a
sentence based not only on the underlying crime but also on the
perjured testimony.207
In the federal system, Section 3C1.1 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines creates the sentence enhancement for
perjury. It states that if the defendant “willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice,” the judge should increase the offense level by
two levels.208 The application notes make clear that Section
3C1.1 covers false testimony at trial.209 Most states similarly
allow some enhancement for a defendant’s perjured trial testimony, either under state sentencing guidelines or as a part of a
judge’s more general sentencing discretion.210
205. See Kevin J. Kelley, Note, To Enhance or Not to Enhance: A Guide to
Uniformity in Applying Perjury Enhancements Under Section 3C1.1 of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines: United States v. Dunnigan, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 585, 585 (1994) (introducing the inconsistent application of perjury enhancements in American courts).
206. See Peter J. Henning, Balancing the Need for Enhanced Sentences for
Perjury at Trial Under Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and a Defendant’s Right to Testify, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 934 (1992).
207. Id.
208. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2008).
209. See id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(b) (stating that the enhancement applies to
conduct including “committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury,
including during the course of a civil proceeding if such perjury pertains to
conduct that forms the basis of the offense of conviction”).
210. See, e.g., Strachan v. State, 615 P.2d 611, 613 (Alaska 1980); State v.
Lask, 663 P.2d 604, 605 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); People v. Redmond, 633 P.2d
976, 982 (Cal. 1981); People v. Wilson, 599 P.2d 970, 972 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979);
State v. Huey, 505 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Conn. 1986); Banks v. United States, 516
A.2d 524, 528 (D.C. 1986); State v. Kohoutek, 619 P.2d 1151, 1152 (Idaho
1980); People v. Meeks, 411 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ill. 1980); State v. Bragg, 388
N.W.2d 187, 189 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986); State v. May, 607 P.2d 72, 76–77 (Kan.
1980); State v. Plante, 417 A.2d 991, 992 (Me. 1980); Atkins v. State, 391 A.2d
868, 870 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); State v. James, 784 P.2d 1021, 1024 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1989); People v. Marchese, 608 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1994); State v. Stewart, 435 N.E.2d 426, 427 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Alicea, 449 A.2d 1381, 1382–83 (Pa. 1982); State v. Bertoldi, 495
A.2d 247, 249 (R.I. 1985); State v. Degen, 396 N.W.2d 759, 760 (S.D. 1986);
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At both the state and federal level, perjury enhancements
have been attacked on the ground that they impermissibly burden a defendant’s constitutional right to testify. The attacks, in
other words, echo Griffin’s oversimplified suggestion that it is
impermissible to “cut down” on the exercise of a constitutional
right by “making its assertion costly.”211
In United States v. Dunnigan, the Supreme Court faced
such a constitutional challenges to section 3C1.1.212 The Court
responded by stated that “a defendant’s right to testify does not
include a right to commit perjury.”213 That response, widely
parroted by state courts upholding their own perjury enhancements,214 has a “beguiling simplicity”215—which is to say that it
is both facile and a bit fatuous. In Griffin, the Court might just
as well have said that “a defendant’s right to remain silent does
not include the right to conceal and withhold relevant evidence.” Indeed, a court can almost always evade an unconstitutional conditions challenge by redefining the scope of the right.
In any event, the Dunnigan Court went on to argue (more
sensibly) that not every rule that burdens a constitutional right
is unconstitutional.
Nor can respondent contend § 3C1.1 is unconstitutional on the simple
basis that it distorts her decision whether to testify or remain silent.
Our authorities do not impose a categorical ban on every governmental action affecting the strategic decisions of an accused, including decisions whether or not to exercise constitutional rights.216

That portion of Dunnigan’s rationale, while inconsistent
with Griffin, is surely correct. Many legal rules burden either
the right to testify or the right to remain silent, and perjury
State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160–61 (Tenn. 1983); In re Welfare of Luft,
589 P.2d 314, 320–21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Finley, 355 S.E.2d 47, 49
(W. Va. 1987).
211. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
212. 507 U.S. 87, 89 (1993).
213. Id. at 96; see also United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978)
(“The right guaranteed by law to a defendant is narrowly the right to testify
truthfully in accordance with the oath . . . .”).
214. See, e.g., In re Perez, 148 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978);
People v. Nedelcoff, 409 N.E.2d 316, 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Atkins v. State,
391 A.2d 868, 871 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); People v. Adams, 425 N.W.2d
437, 442 (Mich. 1988); People v. Malcolm, 612 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1994); State v. Stewart, 435 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bowersox, 690 A.2d 279, 281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); State v. Tiernan,
645 A.2d 482, 487 (R.I. 1994).
215. See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, C.J.).
216. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96.
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enhancements are not unconstitutional on the simple ground
that they chill testimony. The question remains, however,
whether perjury enhancements are sensible as a matter of sentencing policy.
2. The Flawed Rationale of Perjury Enhancements
In approving perjury enhancements, courts have relied on
traditional sentencing goals including deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. They argue that perjury is
wrong and ought to be deterred,217 that a defendant’s perjury
suggests the need for incapacitation and retribution,218 and
that a perjuring defendant demonstrates a lack of remorse and
thus less hope of rehabilitation.219
Those arguments are faulty because they ask and answer
the wrong question. The question is not whether a defendant
who lies on the stand is culpable—surely he is. The question,
rather, is whether a guilty defendant who takes the stand is
more culpable than a guilty defendant who remains silent. The
answer to that question is far from clear for two reasons.
First, while a testifying guilty defendant is culpable for lying to the jury, a non-testifying guilty defendant is culpable for
concealing evidence. There are two kinds of deliberate deceit:
suggestio falsi and suppressio veri.220 The testifying guilty defendant commits the former sin while the non-testifying guilty
defendant commits the latter. In many contexts, the law has
recognized that deception “may consist in silence as well as in
actual outspoken misrepresentation, and there are circumstances when the suppressio veri may be reprehensible as the
suggestio falsi.”221 Under federal mail and wire fraud statutes,
217. See, e.g., United States v. Rohde, 159 F.3d 1298, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998);
State v. Grindle, 942 A.2d 673, 677 (Me. 2008); People v. Marchese, 608
N.Y.S.2d 776, 7853 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
218. See People v. Ramos, 53 P.3d 1178, 1179 (Colo. App. 2002).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1235 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1973); Fox v. State, 569 P.2d 1335, 1337
(Alaska 1977); In re Perez, 148 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); People
v. Wilson, 599 P.2d 970, 974 (Colo. App. 1979); People v. Meeks, 411 N.E.2d 9,
15 (Ill. 1980).
220. See WILLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 169 (2d ed. 1992); see also Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790–1860: Continuity Amidst Change,
39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 407 (1995).
221. The Kalfarli, 277 F. 391, 400 (2d Cir. 1921). The law of conveyances in
property, for example, has long treated the two concepts as equivalent. See,
e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 73 F.2d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 1934); Eppes v.
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for example, affirmative misstatements of fact prove unnecessary for conviction—deceitful concealment suffices.222
Indeed, even Section 3C1.1 recognizes that concealing material evidence constitutes obstruction of justice.223 A guilty defendant who refuses to testify may not affirmatively lie, but he
does conceal evidence. Operating under Griffin’s shadow, courts
have not considered imposing the Section 3C1.1 obstruction
enhancement based on a defendant’s failure to testify. Once
again, the difference between punishments based on testimony
and punishments based on silence creates an unexplained and
unjustified constitutional asymmetry.
Second, a non-testifying guilty defendant often simply has
someone else lie on his behalf. He presents a false defense by
proxy, using other witnesses and his attorney. In general, an
attorney acts as an agent of the client, and a principal can be
held responsible for the acts of his agent.224 In criminal cases as
elsewhere, because an attorney acts as “speaking agent” for her
client, the statements of the defense attorney can be held
against the defendant.225 “A defendant cannot stand idly by
while he hears his attorney provide false information to the
court . . . and then claim that he was exercising his Fifth
Amendment right.”226 If a defendant can be held accountable

Thompson, 79 So. 611, 613 (Ala. 1918); Jacobs v. George, 20 P. 183, 187 (Ariz.
1889); Ambrose v. Barrett, 54 P. 264, 265 (Cal. 1898); Dunlap & Co. v. Cody,
31 Iowa 260, 262 (Iowa 1871); see also Smith v. Babcock, 22 F. Cas. 432, 441
(D. Mass. 1846) (“In such cases there is little if any difference between suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.”).
222. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1997); United States
v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hasson, 333
F.3d 1264, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167,
1173 (9th Cir. 1990); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 579
(1996) (“[A]ctionable fraud requires a material misrepresentation or omission.”
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977))).
223. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(d) (2008).
224. Hayes v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 196 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999); Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1984); LeBlanc v. INS, 715 F.2d
685, 694 (1st Cir. 1983); Ampex Credit Corp. v. Bateman, 554 F.2d 750, 753
(5th Cir. 1977).
225. See United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 31–34 (2d Cir. 1984); see
also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C) (admitting statements authorized by the party’s speaking agents, including attorneys); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 119, § 8.31 (discussing the role of attorneys as “speaking agents”).
226. United States v. Owolabi, 69 F.3d 156, 164 (7th Cir. 1995).
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for lies that he utters with his own mouth, he should also be
held accountable for lies that others utter for him.227
Thus, while it is true that testifying guilty defendants are
culpable for lying, it is also true that many non-testifying guilty
defendants are culpable for concealing evidence and for having
others lie on their behalf. It is hard to see why the former are
more culpable than the latter. If both are equally culpable, perjury enhancements are unjustified. Surprisingly, many courts
have endorsed perjury enhancements without even considering
whether testifying guilty defendants are more culpable than
non-testifying guilty defendants. In this area as in others, the
law reflects an unstated and unjustified preference for silence
over testimony.
3. Perjury Enhancements After Booker
In the federal system after Dunnigan, several circuits held
that Section 3C1.1 enhancements were mandatory if a judge
determined that the defendant lied on the stand.228 Other circuits suggested that enhancements were discretionary.229 Mandatory or not, perjury enhancements have since Dunnigan been
imposed routinely, almost mechanically, across the federal
criminal justice system.230
In the wake of Booker,231 however, courts have both renewed reason and renewed ability to reconsider the imposition
of perjury enhancements. The Guidelines are now advisory—
district courts must consult them, but they are not bound to
apply them.232 In addition to considering the Guidelines, district courts must consider the broader array of factors listed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including “the need to avoid unwarranted
227. See Fuller v. State, 860 A.2d 324, 333 (Del. 2004) (imposing a sentencing enhancement where defendant remained silent but encouraged another
witness to commit perjury).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 948 F.2d 783, 788–89 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Alvarez, 927 F.2d 300, 303 (6th Cir. 1991).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Dillard, 43 F.3d 299, 311 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Cabral-Castillo, 35 F.3d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Yost, 24 F.3d 99, 106 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 468–70 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Weinstein, J.) (discussing the
split of authority); Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 19 (1993) (“There is still interpretive room, in other
words, for restoring equilibrium to the criminal process . . . .”).
230. See Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying
Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2000).
231. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
232. Id. at 264.
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sentence disparities” among similarly situated defendants.233
In short, district courts have greater freedom “to reject (after
due consideration) the advice of the Guidelines,”234 particularly
when a particular provision of the Guidelines makes no sense.
Post-Booker, district courts have greater freedom to decline
Section 3C1.1 enhancements for trial testimony. District courts
should ask themselves: “Is this defendant, who testified at trial
and was found guilty, truly more culpable then another guilty
defendant who remained silent and pressed a false defense by
proxy?” If not, then no enhancement should be imposed. State
court judges, many of whom have even greater sentencing freedom than federal judges, should ask themselves the same question.
Perjurious defendants are culpable, and perjury enhancements are constitutional, but such enhancements are still unwise.
CONCLUSION
The right to remain silent and the right to testify are inextricably intertwined. The extent to which defendants exercise
one right depends on its cost relative to the other. Any penalty
on the right to remain silent raises its relative cost, but also
lowers the relative cost of the right to testify. Any subsidy has
the converse offsetting effect.
Courts and commentators have too often analyzed the
rights separately and have therefore missed the dynamic of offsetting effects. More generally, they have failed to see that labels like “penalty” and “subsidy” are relative terms that can only be measured by reference to some baseline condition.
American courts have unjustifiably struck down rules that
raise the relative cost of silence while upholding rules that
raise the relative cost of testimony. Taken together, these rul233. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006); see Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586,
596–97 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines are not the only consideration, however. Accordingly, after giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the
§ 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by
a party.”).
234. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 577 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 319, 523 (5th Cir.
2008) (“Rita and Kimbrough allow a district court to impose a non-Guideline
sentence based on disagreement with Guideline policy that results in a sentence greater [and presumably less] than necessary to achieve the sentencing
goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”).
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ings can only be explained by positing silence as the desired
normative baseline from which all departures are measured.
American law, in other words, currently reflects an implicit
policy preference for silence over testimony. That preference
has never been explained, and it cannot be justified. More testimony by criminal defendants would improve the accuracy, legitimacy, and fairness of the criminal justice system. Legal
rules that raise the relative cost of testimony undermine these
critically important goals.
Our baseline condition ought to be defined by generally applicable rules of law. To the extent that we depart from such
rules, we should depart in a way that encourages more testimony. At a minimum, we should not depart in a way that encourages silence. For the last half century, American law has
departed in the wrong direction, and it is time to reverse
course.

